Governor and Friend. The development of Severin Løvenskiold governorship until 1849 as seen through the governor’s reports to Oscar I of Sweden and Norway.
How can we understand the role of the Norwegian governor in the Swedish-Norwegian union? This article examines the structure and development of the relationship between Norwegian governor Severin Løvenskiold and king Oscar I between 1844 and 1849 to highlight conflicts and contradictory aspects of the political structure of the Swedish-Norwegian union.
This article examines the development of the governorship under Norwegian governor Severin Løvenskiold between 1844 and 1849. Løvenskiold was the second, and ultimately last, Norwegian that served as governor of Norway in the Swedish-Norwegian union. As governor, Løvenskiold oversaw the first transition between monarchs and governed the Norwegian part of the union through the tumultuous years following the revolutions of 1848. Despite his influential position as governor, Løvenskiold has received surprisingly little attention in the academic literature. This article argues that to properly understand the role Løvenskiold played as governor, it is important to highlight his special relationship to the king and how it enabled him to influence and direct Norwegian politics. The only studies in the current academic literature that addresses the personal relationship between Løvenskiold and Oscar to any significant degree are Olaf Gjerlow’s biography Stattholder Severin Løvenskiold (1948) and Wilhelm Keilhau’s Tidsrummet 1840 til omkring 1875 (1931). These studies neglect, however, to mention the impact of the revolutions of 1848 upon Løvenskiold’s role as governor and how the governor’s influence changed as his relationship with the king deteriorated. This article therefore focuses especially on the period between March 1848 and April 1849. By focusing the study on the governor’s reports to Oscar during this period, it hopes to contextualise and clarify the nuances of Løvenskiold’s political character from a new perspective.
Despite his influential position as governor, Løvenskiold has received surprisingly little attention in the academic literature.
To identify how Løvenskiold exerted his influence, this article first identifies how the governor’s role was defined by the previous governor, Herman Wedel Jarlsberg and then examines how Løvenskiold changed Wedel’s established system to better fit his own style of governance. Then it shows how this system, reliant on the close political relationship between Løvenskiold and Oscar, was challenged by their disagreements over the important question of intervention in the first Schleswig war between March 1848 and April 1849. These reports demonstrate how Løvenskiold, as governor, attempted to maintain a balance between Oscar’s interests and his own concerns for Norwegian affairs by advising the monarch in a dualistic manner. Personally, he expressed a desire for a hasty intervention to aid the Danish against the German invaders, while as governor he would repeatedly argue for the need for caution and compromise to maintain domestic political stability. Not until the economic and political situation had stabilised Løvenskiold was willing to also support the intervention fully as governor. Oscar, however, decided to repeatedly ignore Løvenskiold’s advice and pushed through the required approval for his planned intervention. Oscar’s decision to go against Løvenskiold’s advice marked an important shift in the political relationship between the king and the governor. It was the first failure of Løvenskiold in influencing Oscar on an important matter related to Norwegian politics and the only time Løvenskiold tolerated Oscar going directly against him on policy.
The main perspective of this article is through the governor’s reports sent from Løvenskiold approximately every fortnight in Christiania to Oscar in Stockholm. These reports provide insight into how the governor advised and informed the monarch on all manners considered important. The reports were originally part of the governor’s official duty to report to the king but by the 1840s also reflected other roles played by the governor on the political stage such as advisor, government leader, and negotiator. In the reports a personal friendship between governor and monarch also becomes evident. Between official concerns the reports include personal and confidential communication such as requests for political favours, family issues, and most critically; a supplementary, personal perspective from Løvenskiold that often contradicted the advice he was giving in his official capacity as governor. The reports therefore reveal a personal friendship between Oscar and Løvenskiold, that went outside of the formal position that other ministers enjoyed with the king. This part-personal, part-official correspondence found in the reports reflect the muddled and contradicting roles the governor played on the political stage after 1836.
The expansion of the governorship
Before 1836 the governor only acted as the king’s substitute in Christiania, a solution forced by the king not being able to simultaneously govern both kingdoms in which he was sovereign. With the appointment of Wedel in 1836, the governor was gradually given more political autonomy as the king’s confidence grew in the soundness of the Norwegian government. As a result the governor and government assumed a more autonomous position between the parliament and monarch. Once the position of the government had solidified in 1839, the role of the governor can be said to have become threefold. First, reporting and advising the monarch on Norwegian issues. Second, as premier of the Norwegian government in Christiania. And third, as a mediator between the parliament and monarch. With each of these roles came unique expectations of loyalty and responsibility towards parliament, government, and monarch that often were at odds with the others. Wedel proved his value to Carl Johan by managing to improve the political situation considerably within only three years. Sverre Steen describes the change between the mood in parliament in 1836 and 1839 as the difference between a state of war and peace.
The period that followed between 1840-44 saw the transition between governors and monarchs. Wedel retired due to ill health in 1840 and passed away shortly afterwards. Løvenskiold was then appointed to be Wedel’s successor by Carl Johan. Due to Løvenskiold’s reputation as an arch-conservative monarchist, many in parliament initially feared a return to the confrontational pre-1836 style of governance, but Løvenskiold governed with the same restraint that characterised Wedel’s governorship. The subsequent death of the king, Carl Johan, in 1844 seemed to finally put an end to the old political conflicts that had plagued the relationship between the monarch and parliament. The crown prince, Oscar, had until then been in the shadow of his ambitious father, so his political opinions were largely unknown. Oscar’s initial willingness to placate parliamentary demands both in Norway and Sweden led to general attitude of liberalisation in the union. To the Norwegian political class, the acceptance of new official flags in 1844 and separate royal honours in 1847 were strong signals that the new king was supportive of parity rather than subjugation within the union. Other than these symbolic gestures, Oscar kept himself out of Norwegian politics. Most in parliament felt that it was best not to disturb the political peace that the monarch’s absence had created. Any reforms that would address the structural imbalances of the union in foreign policy was therefore not achieved before 1848. The union settled into a period of calm as neither king nor parliament carried out any significant attempt at reform. Oscar’s passivity towards Norwegian politics before 1848 is further underlined in that the king kept the government he had inherited, despite Løvenskiold as governor reflecting the conservative politics of his father far more than his own.
Without a strong, independent monarchical influence upon the Norwegian political system between 1844-8, Løvenskiold as governor became the most influential figure in Norwegian politics, but also the main target of political discontent. Although the parliaments of 1842 and 1845 were as cooperative as in 1839, the relationship would never become as friendly as it had been under Wedel. The simplest explanation is that Løvenskiold was too much of a political dinosaur by the 1840s. He was already 67 when Oscar ascended to the throne and still governed according to the same conservative principles as he had held at Eidsvold in 1814. The newer generation of reformers entering parliament detested his arch-conservative politics, while the older members of parliament still remembered Løvenskiold’s role in the dismissal of parliament of 1836 as an indication that his sympathies lay with the monarchy in Stockholm rather than with the parliament. The popular discontent towards Løvenskiold was expressed most clearly in the press. The newspaper of the opposition, Morgenbladet, described Løvenskiold as “the most unpopular man in the country.” Even the conservative paper, Den Constitutionelle, wrote that the decision to appoint Løvenskiold was unwise when the royal decree was publicised in February 1841. This discontent manifested itself politically by slowly shifting the consensus in the parliament towards reforms that challenged the leading authority of the governor. This is evident in that even before the news of revolution came in March 1848, significant reforms were already planned for discussion in parliament. The parliamentary voices calling for a greater parliamentary influence upon the government even gained an ally inside the government after 1846. Fredrik Stang, the new, young minister of the interior was repeatedly mentioned in Løvenskiold’s reports to Oscar as a troublemaker that undermined the unity of the government. Thus the parliamentary support which Wedel in his time has used to blunt the more extreme demands of the king was turning against Løvenskiold by the spring of 1848.
Due to his troubled relationship with parliament, Løvenskiold instead leaned more heavily on his personal relationship with Oscar to maintain his influential position as the undisputed leader of the government. The most significant change contributing to this was in not sharing the content of his reports to the king with his government colleagues. This had been an extremely rare occurrence under Wedel but became the norm under Løvenskiold.
The reports rarely told the king directly which decision to take, instead selectively including statements and perspectives that naturally lead the king to favour the policy the government desired.
Wilhelm Keilhau argues that Løvenskiold saw himself more as the king’s man in Norway rather than as the leader of the government compared to Wedel. Løvenskiold’s choice to increase the secrecy of his correspondence supports such an interpretation. It allowed him to increase his personal control over the flow of information to the king about Norwegian affairs, while weakening the influence of the other members of the government upon his role as governor. This was due to the way the government influenced the king through its advice expressed in the governor’s reports. The reports rarely told the king directly which decision to take, instead selectively including statements and perspectives that naturally lead the king to favour the policy the government desired.
With Løvenskiold strictly controlling what information passed onto the king, the reports were no longer always reflecting the advice of the entire government. Løvenskiold used this secrecy to give advice behind his cabinets back. An example is seen in the report from April 13, 1848, when Løvenskiold desired a reshuffle of his cabinet asking, or rather politely instructing, Oscar on whom to replace. In this report, Løvenskiold reminds Oscar that the written opinions on his cabinet colleagues are strictly for the king, not to be shared. This manipulative form of government strengthened Løvenskiold’s position as governor, but likely contributed to distrust within the government. This distrust was reflected in the inherent scepticism of the cabinet on most issues during the spring of 1848. Therefore, it can be said that Løvenskiold while Løvenskiold increased his personal control over policy, he also helped further the divide that existed within the government before 1848.
Year of crisis
These previously mentioned political problems which had built up since Løvenskiold assumed the role of governor resurfaced in a series of events that challenged the stability of Løvenskiold’s system of governance after news of a popular revolution in Paris reached the press in Christiania on March 8, 1848. Løvenskiold quickly acted to prevent a popular revolution. The unrest in the streets melted away without a shot being fired when soldiers entered Christiania. On March 19, Løvenskiold reports with a hint of pride that everything was quiet and secure in Christiania. By contrast, the initial events the king experienced in Stockholm were far more dramatic. The protests had descended into looting and had to be put down by force which resulted in over twenty citizens killed.
These events were minor compared to those in the larger European states, but the prospect of further unrest likely had a strong influence on Oscar. Eva Helene Ulvros marks the start of the revolution as the political turning point in Oscar’s life from a liberal to a conservative monarch. Oscar’s confidence in his Swedish government was at least shook, he sacked eight of his nine Swedish ministers. In Norway there were also changes, but these should be understood as a sign of the king’s confidence in Løvenskiold because they were orchestrated by Løvenskiold. To appease the moderate supporters of the reformists in parliament, Løvenskiold recommended the appointment of two members of parliament, Hans Riddervold and Anton Martin Schweigaard to the government. Schweigaard made Løvenskiold choose Søren Anton Wilhelm Sørensen instead. All these men enjoyed the confidence of the majority within the parliament, including most of the reformists. By appeasing the moderate elements of parliament, demands for the complete removal of the current government fell away. Already on April 14 Løvenskiold reports an improvement of the mood in parliament. While the revolution had initially caused some unrest in both countries, it was clear that the political situation in Norway appeared considerably more stable in this initial period. Much of the credit for a return to stability must go to Løvenskiold’s governance that, despite its unpopularity, managed to quickly calm both the popular and parliamentary unrest.
Løvenskiold could not, however, prevent events abroad from creating new economic and political difficulties that escalated tensions between governor and parliament. By April, the economy was already predicted to be heading into a severe recession triggered by a decline in exports. In France and Great Britain, the two biggest importers of Norwegian wood, buyers had already failed to pay several of the shipments arriving which forced merchants to return with their goods unsold. On March 30, Løvenskiold informed Oscar that large emergency loans were needed. At the same time, the conflict in Denmark between the government and German nationalists concerning possessions over the duchy of Schleswig flared up. It had initially been contained within the country, but on April 12 Prussian troops moved in to assist the rebels. The potential for a war must have been a concern for Løvenskiold even before the Prussian intervention escalated the conflict. Already on March 30, Løvenskiold mentions the initial drafting of a proposal from the government to parliament for the increase of military budget. The Norwegian army suffered from decades of neglect and was severely underfunded. Løvenskiold had secured the unanimous support of his government for the initial proposal, but the decision to appropriate funding would rest on parliament.
The two following months of advice within the reports to Oscar reveals the complicated, but steadfast principles that guided Løvenskiold as governor. For despite his personal lamentations to Oscar over the slowness of parliament procedure, there was never a suggestion of intervention into parliamentary affairs. Løvenskiold expressed his personal distaste for the opinions and actions of parliament but respected their constitutional prerogatives as much as he did for the monarch. This dualistic form switched between using his personal relation to support and his professional responsibility to warn the king. This can be found when looking at almost any issue discussed in the spring of 1848, even when it concerned Løvenskiold’s family. In early April in his professional role as governor, Løvenskiold asked Oscar to forgive his family’s involvement in the conflict after his son had volunteered in what was still a civil war. But as a proud father, he would later brag about his son’s accomplishments in battle after the king’s support for intervention was certain on May 11. This also applies to the question of intervention. When advising the monarch on the Schleswig conflict, Løvenskiold would personally mention his friend, Hans Faye’s, opinion that Swedish troops would be the worst for the Germans. His specific avoidance of mentioning any Norwegian involvement in these encouragements for intervention reflects, however, a connection to what Løvenskiold had repeatedly warned of in the reports since March; the Norwegian military and economy was not prepared for war. Thus, although Løvenskiold was personally clearly advising Oscar to do something to aid the Danish, he was also right up until May 7 extensively detailing the various ongoing economic and political issues in his professional role as governor as a warning to Oscar. Løvenskiold’s advice was therefore characterised overall by warnings against a foreign conflict involving Norway.
There was no precedent for how the king should approach these issues as there had been no war since 1814. Oscar’s decision to commit himself before consulting the Norwegian government and parliament was therefore not only significant regarding the question of intervention, but also in the precedent it created for the future of foreign policy procedure.
It must therefore have come as a surprise to Løvenskiold when Oscar’s decision for 15000 Swedish and 3000 Norwegian troops to be sent to Denmark arrived in the evening on May 7. The king had on May 4 already committed himself to this policy by warning the Prussian government of his intention, without first asking the Norwegian government and parliament. As head of state, deciding foreign policy was Oscar’s prerogative, but the Norwegian constitution also required the king to seek the approval of the parliament for the use of Norwegian troops abroad. This was uncharted waters. There was no precedent for how the king should approach these issues as there had been no war since 1814. Oscar’s decision to commit himself before consulting the Norwegian government and parliament was therefore not only significant regarding the question of intervention, but also in the precedent it created for the future of foreign policy procedure. The king had put himself above both parliament and government and was now asking for their endorsement.
The importance of Løvenskiold’s next decision can be seen in that it took five days of deliberation within the government before an answer came back. Løvenskiold and most of his cabinet colleagues agreed that it was best to follow Oscar’s lead despite the potential problems that the intervention posed. Their stated justification was that there was both a moral and strategic need to defend the integrity of Denmark. The minority, with Stang as their ringleader argued that a lack of justification and that the present economic problems already troubling Norway would make a war disastrous. These arguments against supporting the intervention were of the same nature as those Løvenskiold warned about, yet Løvenskiold describes Stang’s opposition as if it was treason. For Løvenskiold the case was a matter of duty, the king had made up his mind on a matter of foreign policy, and the government had a constitutional obligation to support it, even if it was against their own interests.
The king had put himself above both parliament and government and was now asking for their endorsement.
Løvenskiold’s reluctance was, however, expressed even in his declaration of support. The initial response on May 11 warned Oscar not to act without guarantees of support from both Great Britain and Russia. The Russian government had by this time been the only government to accept the inquiries for loans the Norwegian government needed, but as these loans had not yet been official granted, Løvenskiold might have been hoping to avoid any diplomatic crisis that could upset the negotiations. Oscar had received approval for the intervention from the Russian government already on May 4, but this appears unknown to Løvenskiold and the rest of the government in Christiania. That the government in Stockholm and Christiania were separately communicating and receiving isolated answers from the Russian government, further underlines the existing issues of the divide present within the foreign policy interests of the two kingdoms. Løvenskiold was reporting all these interactions in his reports to Oscar, but it does not seem like Oscar felt obligated to return the gesture.
After the government had declared its support for Oscar on May 14, the matter was prepared for the parliament. Løvenskiold’s confidence that parliament would approve Oscar’s intervention was, however, low. This was directly expressed in both the report on May 14 and May 21. It is also likely the reason there was both a notable increase in flattery towards Oscar and in condemnation of those against the intervention. Stang specifically, was blamed both for the divide within the government and for strengthening the opposition in parliament. This must have worked in infuriating Oscar because the king sent an official rebuke that Løvenskiold read aloud in cabinet. Yet, on May 28, Løvenskiold reports that Stang complained openly in cabinet about Oscar’s strong criticisms of the Norwegian government. To protect his relationship with the monarch, Løvenskiold had thus further alienated himself from his government.
The debate over the intervention had created a clear political divide for and against the government that rallied a strong opposition that could potentially have challenged the legitimacy of the government and governor. This had not been the case since Wedel’s early days as governor. If parliament had refused to sanction Oscar’s use of Norwegian troops, it would have been the greatest political crisis for the union since its inception. Crisis was however averted. Late in the evening on May 29 the parliament in closed session relented, allowing for troops to be sent and funding to be granted without any assurances of constitutional reforms. Alf Kaartvedt argues that the parliament did not dare to face the political fallout that a refusal would result in under the current political climate. Oscar had already signed his pledge to support Denmark on May 11 and gained the support of the Swedish parliament, so Swedish-Norwegian involvement could not be stopped by the Norwegian parliament. Parliament desired reforms, but as in the case of the Thrane movement three years later, with the spectre of radical revolution haunting Europe there was too much at risk to fight a political battle against the monarchy. Oscar had gotten his approval, but at the cost of a disgruntled government and a more unified parliamentary opposition.
The debate over the intervention had created a clear political divide for and against the government that rallied a strong opposition that could potentially have challenged the legitimacy of the government and governor.
What motivated Oscar to go against the cautious advice of Løvenskiold? Ulvros emphasises his desire for a rapid intervention by his personal guarantee to the Danish king that he would assist any attack on Denmark and his newfound fear of the spread of revolution. Although Oscar’s actions initially aligned himself with such a reactionary stance it should be emphasised, as Kaartvedt argues, that Oscar was using the war as a way of securing a future Scandinavian union by using Swedish-Norwegian military participation as leverage for making the childless Fredrik VII adopt the Swedish crown prince as his heir. That this was Oscar’s primary motive is further supported by Oscar’s non-existent enthusiasm for further intervention after the armistice in August 1848, when these ambitions were blunted by Russian pressure to withdraw. The Swedish-Norwegian troops returned home by September without seeing combat. Løvenskiold’s perspective in this period is unfortunately poorly documented. The reports leave a gap between the last events of May until mid-September as Løvenskiold moved to meet Oscar’s court in Malmø for the summer. With a lack of documentation, it is hard to say how strong Løvenskiold’s influence on Oscar’s decisions were in this active period of the war, but it appears from the following period that it was insignificant.
The reports resume in mid-September. Now that the king had secured financing for soldiers and the intervention was legally approved, the matter was outside of the Norwegian parliament’s reach. As the matter could no longer be used as leverage against the government, Løvenskiold could see no reason not to fully commit himself to the Danish side as he had wished to do since the spring of 1848. Until April 1849, Løvenskiold would repeatedly stress the need for continued support to the Danish anti-revolutionary side to Oscar, e.g. on October 8, when he warns that if the Danish crisis was not settled properly, then revolutionary movements like those seen in spring would resurface in Sweden and Norway. In the report on February 16, 1849, Løvenskiold warns of a growing desire to resume the war in Denmark, despite Russia and Great Britain still attempting to negotiate a settlement. His prediction would prove correct two months later, when Denmark broke the armistice on 3 April. On April 22, after receiving the news that no direct action would be taken by the Swedish government, Løvenskiold penned his most dramatic report of the period. He directly encouraged Oscar to take immediate military action and to declare his support for Denmark. He could see no logical reason why Oscar would change his position from the last year and reminded him of his moral duty. This is the last report from Løvenskiold that addressed the issue of intervention. Swedish-Norwegian troops would participate in the peacekeeping of Schleswig once the final negotiation was settled in 1850, but any direct military support for Denmark was rejected by Oscar.
Although Oscar’s policy at times shared similarities to some of Løvenskiold’s advice, the hasty declaration in May 1848 to the decision to stay out of the conflict in April 1849 underlines the point that Løvenskiold’s and Oscar’s interests were only superficially similar. When this superficiality was confronted by the need for action, Løvenskiold’s lack of actual influence in foreign policy was exposed. Despite repeated attempts through both personal encouragement and professional warnings, Løvenskiold could not dissuade Oscar. As the system of the governorship after 1836 was built upon the notion that the monarch would respect the concerns of the government and parliament to ensure political stability, Oscar’s decision also damaged the credibility of Løvenskiold as governor. The way in which the Norwegian parliament and government had been forcefully made to go along with the plans already decided in Stockholm vanquished the illusion of parity between Sweden and Norway that the union had seemingly moved towards since Oscar’s ascension to the throne. How sensitive the union was to Oscar’s sudden forcefulness is evident in how quickly and widely the political opinion turned against the king, both within the government and in parliament in the spring of 1848. Much of the anger had been building up over a decade of political stagnation which Løvenskiold had only temporarily suppressed as governor. Yet it was Oscar’s actions that unified the reformists in parliament in May, after Løvenskiold had divided their attempts at a peaceful coup of the government in March. Although a crisis threatening the integrity of the union was avoided by the eventual cooperation of parliament, the king has spent the goodwill built up over ten years of cooperation. The first sign that the mood was changing against the king was in the united opposition of the government and parliament against any new foreign policy adventure after 1848. In other Norwegian affairs outside of that which directly affected the intervention, however, Oscar continued to only play a passive role, following Løvenskiold’s advice. Oscar decision to go against Løvenskiold's advice on the matter of intervention in Schleswig did therefore not signal an immediate change to Løvenskiold’s influence on regular affairs in Norwegian politics. Løvenskiold still held the same responsibilities as governor and still maintained an almost exclusive, influence upon the king as he had since 1844. The Schleswig intervention is significant in that it demarcated boundaries for Løvenskiold’s influence over the king.
As for Løvenskiold and Oscar’s personal relationship, the close personal political partnership remained for several more years but was weakened by distrust. Løvenskiold had loyally followed Oscar against his better judgement and repeatedly been left disappointed by the king’s refusal to listen to his advice. From his repeated and increasingly direct expressions of support for the Danish cause, Løvenskiold clearly felt strongly about the issues he was advising Oscar on, and the deterioration of their relationship was caused by this incident, as the governor likely felt it was a personal, moral betrayal of his confidence rather than just a political disagreement. The resentment and scepticism felt was finally expressed directly by Løvenskiold in 1854 when Oscar again attempted to coerce the governor into supporting his plans for joining Great Britain and France against the Russians in the Crimean war. Løvenskiold was not willing to give any more reassurances to the king. He directly confronted Oscar, stating that the Norwegian people would not follow him into a war. When Oscar continued to persist despite his warnings, he would tender his resignation. There was ultimately a limit for what even Løvenskiold would put up with. The period of 1844 to 1849 that this study has focused on can therefore be said to have been the period of important development for the political relationship between the governor and king that exposed the flaws and differences that ultimately would make their political partnership untenable.
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Ulvros, Eva Helen, Oscar I: en biografi. Stockholm: Historiska Media, 2007.
 Wilhelm Keilhau, Tidsrummet 1840 til omkring 1875, Volume 9, Det Norske Folks Liv og Historie Gjennem Tidene (Oslo: Aschehoug, 1931)
Olaf Gjerløw, Stattholder Severin Løvenskiold (Oslo: Aschehoug, 1948)
 Narve Bjørgo, Øystein Rian, and Alf Kaartvedt. Selvstendighet og union: fra middelalderen til 1905 ,Volume 1, Norsk utenrikspolitikks historie (Oslo: Universitetsforlag, 1995) 239.
 Sverre Steen, Et fritt Norge, Volume 6, Det Frie Norge (Oslo: Cappelen, 1972) 43.
 Ibid., 281.
 Keilhau, Tidsrummet 1840 til omkring 1875, 143.
 Ibid., 144.
 Gjerløw, Stattholder Severin Løvenskiold , 181.
 Anne Lise Seip, Nasjonen bygges: 1830-1870, Volume 8, Aschehougs Norgeshistorie (Oslo: Aschehoug, 2005) 195.
 Keilhau, Tidsrummet 1840 til omkring 1875, 146.
 Gjerløw, Stattholder Severin Løvenskiold, 198.
 Ibid., 98.
 Keilhau, Tidsrummet 1840 til omkring 1875, 144.
 Gjerløw, Stattholder Severin Løvenskiold, 180.
 Anne Lise Seip, “The revolution on the Norwegian scene” in Haupt Dowe, and Sperber Langewiesche, Europe in 1848: Revolution and Reform (New York: Berghahn Books, 2001) 315.
 Gjerløw, Stattholder Severin Løvenskiold, 185.
 Keilhau, Tidsrummet 1840 til omkring 1875, 147.
 Steen, Et fritt Norge, 44.
 Keilhau, Tidsrummet 1840 til omkring 1875, 147.
 RA, Løvenskiolds stattholderrapporter, PDF av kildeutgave under arbeid ved Riksarkivet, basert på maskinskrevne avskrifter i Riksarkivets avskriftsamling, Avskrifter fra svenske arkiv, NRA/EA-4022/H/L0214–L0216., 329.
 Seip, The revolution on the Norwegian scene, 315.
 Seip, Nasjonen bygges: 1830-1870, 180.
 RA, Løvenskiolds stattholderrapporter, 294.
 Eva Helen Ulvros, Oscar I: en biografi (Stockholm: Historiska Media, 2007) 222.
 Ulvros, Oscar I, 224.
 RA, Løvenskiolds stattholderrapporter, 303.
 Ibid., 313.
 RA, Løvenskiolds stattholderrapporter, 315.
Kaartvedt, Selvstendighet og union, 261-2.
 RA, Løvenskiolds stattholderrapporter, 298.
 Ibid., 301.
 Ibid., 299.
 Ibid., 308.
 Ibid., 341.
 Ibid., 326.
 Keilhau, Tidsrummet 1840 til omkring 1875, 175.
 Kaartvedt, Selvstendighet og union, 276.
 Ibid., 276.
 Ibid., Selvstendighet og union, 277.
 Kaartvedt, Selvstendighet og union, 277-8.
 Ibid., 278
 RA, Løvenskiolds stattholderrapporter, 344.
 Ibid., 340-1.
 Ibid., 341.
 Kaartvedt, Selvstendighet og union, 276.
 RA, Løvenskiolds stattholderrapporter, 345, 347.
 Ibid., 349.
 Ibid., 352.
 Ibid., 353.
 Kaartvedt, Selvstendighet og union, 279.
 Ulvros, Oscar I, 209.
 Kaartvedt, Selvstendighet og union, 275.
 Henrik Becker-Christensen, “The idea of Scandinavianism” in E.I. Kouri, The Cambridge history of Scandinavia:1520-1870. Volume 2 of The Cambridge history of Scandinavia (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003) 931.
 RA, Løvenskiolds stattholderrapporter, 358-9.
 Ibid., 401.
 Ibid., 436.
 Kaartvedt, Selvstendighet og union, 283.
 RA, Løvenskiolds stattholderrapporter, 1030.
 Kaartvedt, Selvstendighet og union, 283.
Theodor Jørgen Lund - Governor and Friend: The development of Severin Løvenskiold governorship until 1849 as seen through the governor’s reports to Oscar I of Sweden and Norway