Beware the Talons: Developments in the historiography on the US-Latin American relationship during the Cold War

The relationship between the United States and Latin America during the Cold War and in general has often been portrayed as the American eagle preying upon its weaker neighbors in the south. More recently historians have started bringing Latin American actors “in from the Cold”, showing a far more dynamic and multisided relationship than the traditional static and one-sided portrayal of the American predator and its victims.

Meeting between President Augusto Pinochet of Chile and Secretary of State and National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger. Photo: Archivo General Histórico del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de Chile.

The historiography of the US-Latin American relationship during the Cold War has traditionally been less explored than other parts of the US’ international relations during the Cold War. Often dominated by historians critical of US foreign policy, many of the hardships and the internal violence that characterized the region during the Cold War have often been explained as results of US policy towards the Western hemisphere. However, as newer historians have paid greater attention to non-superpower actors during the Cold War, particularly the thoughts and actions of Latin Americans, scholars have added nuance to the understanding of the US-Latin American relationship during the period. How and why have the historiography on Latin America during the Cold War developed since the end of the Cold War? How has the understanding of American power developed within this literature?

In this essay, I will examine how and why the historiography has unfolded in the manner it has. I will argue that a central theme in the literature has been the decentering and nuancing of the US role in the region, with historians increasingly focusing on the agency of Latin Americans in shaping events in the region as well as paying increased attention to the multilateral nature of the inter-American relationship. I will start by looking at how the overall framework of how historians approach the region has developed; then I will move on to look at two thematic developments that characterizes this changing framework: agency and multilateralism. The first will be illustrated through the examination of the developing literature on the US support for and alliance with military right-wing regimes in the Southern Cone during the 1970s. The second will be illustrated by examining the literature covering the effects of the Cuban Revolution in the Western Hemisphere and Africa.

 

Explaining US-Latin American relations during the Cold War

Latin America received relatively little attention within the early historiography of the Cold War. As early Cold War historians were mainly concentrated on explaining the origins of the Cold War and who started it, scholars mainly focused on US policies towards Europe and East Asia where the Cold War concerns first emerged.[1] The historians that did approach US Cold War policies towards Latin America have mainly approached it from the so-called “revisionist” school, which Edward Crapole has identified as one of the three major interpretations of the early Cold War historiography.[2] The revisionist school, developed from William Appleman Williams’ critique of American foreign policy, explained the Cold War as a result of the US attempting to establish economic hegemony after 1945. Particularly the notion of American hegemony has carried much weight in the historiography of US-Latin American relations.[3] Much of this scholarship has been concentrated around what Tanya Harmer has termed “a rather sporadic crisis-ridden narrative…” that have tended to, at least in hindsight, give the US the power to dominate events and relationships in the hemisphere.[4] The most prominent example is Walter LaFeber’s Inevitable Revolutions, which argued that US Cold War policies towards the region mainly function to consolidate US hegemony in the hemisphere and perpetuate Latin America’s chronic poverty.[5] The depiction of the US as the regional hegemon also tends to portray the US as having agency, while Latin America is mainly acted upon, or as Max Friedman puts it “a puppetmaster pulling the strings of puppet leaders…”.[6]

By increasing the focus on the Latin American part of the relationship, historians increasingly sought to explain why the Cold War had been such a violent period in the region.

From the late 1980s onwards, historians started to reformulate how to approach the Cold War as the conflict itself ended. Historians like Geir Lundestad and Michael Hunt criticized American diplomatic historians for their lack of non-American sources and incorporation of an international perspective in their exploration of the early Cold War years. Lundestad pointed in particular to “American provincialism” meaning the tendency among American diplomatic historians to argue for Washington’s ability to determine events in different parts of the world.[7] The historians of diplomatic history focusing on the region, like Piero Gleijeses and Stephen Rabe, continued to produce works concentrated on the actions and thoughts of US policymakers, albeit their conclusions were more nuanced and sensitive to the limitations of US power than historians like LaFeber had been.[8] Simultaneously, scholars of area studies started incorporating Latin American sources into diplomatic histories, showing a greater extent of agency among Latin American states in their ability to shape their relationship with the US rather than being dependent victims. This made historians like Michael Hogan argue that diplomatic historians should follow the methods laid out by area studies to produce more internationally oriented works.[9] Indeed, since the mid-2000s, most historians working with the Cold War have followed Odd Arne Westad’s framework of a global Cold War, which pays more attention to the actions and ideas of Third World leaders for explaining how and why the Cold War developed. This approach advocates a more “from below” approach to international relations during the Cold War.[10]

Westad’s global Cold War framework reframed the historical debate over the US-Latin American relationship during the Cold War. By increasing the focus on the Latin American part of the relationship, historians increasingly sought to explain why the Cold War had been such a violent period in the region. One of the first comprehensive interpretations following this approach was Hal Brands’ Latin America’s Cold War. He argues that a series of multisided conflicts that characterized the region, was tied together and fueled by outside interventions, internal instability and ideological extremism of both the left and the right. A central tenant in Brands’ approach is the decentering of US power from the Cold War developments in the region. This mainly meant to stress the agency of Latin American actors in the region in perpetuating the conflict and serves as a counterpoint to the traditional portrayal of the US hegemon.[11] An alternative framework was launched by Grandin and Joseph as “the long Cold War”. This concept attempted to fuse the patterns and complexities of violence in the region with the imperial patterns perpetuated by the Cold War. The framework argues that the Cold War constituted a particularly important period of “Latin America’s revolutionary twentieth century”, which constitutes the rise of American hemispheric and global preponderance with the resistance against it within the rest of the hemisphere. While the tension between American hegemonic preponderance and Latin American agency is more central to Grandin and Joseph’s interpretation, they too are mainly concerned with how local actors and movements understood and adapted to the superpower conflict.[12]

While the historians now concentrate on the Latin American side of the relationship and attempts to explain the Cold War on Latin American terms and how it fits within Latin American history, how one understands the US’ role is less clear. Tanya Harmer have presented an alternative framework that attempts to establish Latin American agency without delegating the US to the position of an outsider acting towards the region. Her concept of the inter-American Cold War is an attempt to weave together the perspectives of various Latin American states and the US into a multidimensional narrative showing how the events unfolded in an interactive manner rather than being attributable to one first cause.[13] It is within this framework we find Stephen Rabe’s concept The Killing Zone. While the book is firmly placed within the literature that concentrates on the thoughts and actions of US policymakers, it is also an attempt to nuance our understanding of American power in the region. As Rabe points out, that while the US was (and is) immensely more powerful than any of its Latin American counterparts it does not make it omnipotent. Rather, Rabe attempts to place the US as one of several actors in the hemisphere, one that had limits to its power and could be manipulated but also one whose action exacerbated and perpetuated the violent affair that was the Cold War in Latin America.[14] 

 

Latin Americanizing agency and holding the US accountable

 

Portrait of President João Goulart of Brazil. Goulart serves as an example of how various Latin American states attempted to use the “Cuban Question” for their own benefits. However, Goulart’s flirtation with neutrality also caused alarm in Washington, leading to the latter’s support for the democratically elected president’s removal. Photo: Lula Marques/ Agênica PT.

The first of the major features of the developing literature on the US-Latin American relationship during the Cold War is the developing understanding of agency on the part of Latin American actors and the accountability of the US. Much of the historical debate on the Cold War in Latin America has unfolded itself within the still ongoing confrontation with the violent past in the region. The various truth commissions established in several countries in the Southern Cone and Central America have worked to uncover and bring justice for the human rights abuse that occurred in the region in the 1970s and 80s. The commissions have mainly avoided exploring the role the US played in this violence, and, as Rabe have pointed out, a public debate about the subject in the US have been negligible.[15] Nonetheless, the US have contributed immensely to the developing historical and judicial debate through the massive declassification program started by the Clinton administration (despite objections from the CIA). Of these, the declassification of documents relating to the Nixon administration’s policy towards Chile have been examined closest by historians.[16] As Harmer have argued, the Nixon administration’s involvement in Chile have often been presented as the case study of the administration’s Latin America policy.[17] While the knowledge of American involvement in Chile was established before the coup, it is only in the 2000s that historians have been able to show the extent of the Nixon administration’s involvement in Chile.

…while the US was (and is) immensely more powerful than any of its Latin American counterparts it does not make it omnipotent.

A significant proportion of the literature on the US involvement in Chile have been directed towards holding US accountability. While some scholars, like Kristian Gustaffson, still question the impact the Nixon administration’s covert policies against Chile, the general consensus is that the Nixon administration went to great lengths to destabilize Chile and foment a coup against Allende.[18] However, the causal impact of the Nixon administration’s policy is also not the main interest of this literature. Rather, the Nixon administration’s action against Allende and its subsequent support for Augusto Pinochet’s regime is seen more in the light of the violence it opened for and perpetuated.[19] One example, Peter Kornbluh’s The Pinochet File, is presented in this manner. It does not present a causal thesis but is more concentrated on providing a descriptive account of the thoughts and actions of the Nixon administration towards Chile, showing, with primary sources in the book, the lengths the officials were willing to go to in order to remove Allende.[20] In lieu of a public and judicial debate over the American support for violent regimes in the Southern Cone during the 1970s, this work serves, as Kornbluh argues, as a way to show the actions of these men and thus let history reach a verdict on them.[21]

The Orlando Letelier and Ronni Moffit Memorial at Sheridan Circle, Washington D.C. The American involvement in the 1973 military coup in Chile and its aftermath has long served as a starting point for discussing the consequences of American Cold War policy towards Latin America and the question of justice for the culprits. Photo: Institute for Policy Studies.

As sources from the Southern Cone have become more accessible with time, historians have also sought to understand the agency of the Latin American actors involved. Particularly Tanya Harmer’s Allende’s Chile have gone extensively in this direction. What Harmer shows is that while the Nixon administration wanted to remove Allende, they did not have control over the forces they cultivated. By applying a regional context, rather than examine the developments from Washington, Harmer shows that the local understandings of the Cold War, particularly the apocalyptical understanding that existed among right-wing military forces in both Chile and Brazil were a key component in understanding the strong opposition to Allende’s government and why the following years became so violent in the region. The initiative to act against Allende was pushed by the Brazilian military dictatorship and the Chilean military rather than Washington.[22]

Thus, the understanding of Washington’s role in the promotion of military dictatorship in the region is best summed up by Rabe, arguing that the period between 1969 and 1976, US anti-communist policies towards the region helped wage the Cold War in the region successfully. However, the forces helped unleashed in this process, was not directed by Washington.[23] As Brands have argued, the military regimes in the Southern Cone constituted an anti-communist bloc aligned with Washington, but they had their own goals and even challenged their allies.[24] Harmer have further shown how Chile berated its Cold War ally for not waging the Cold War enough. While Washington sought, at least to an extent, to curtail the violent policies of the regimes in the Southern Cone, it could not control them.[25] This is best illustrated in the Letelier assassination, where Chile assassinated a former Allende official in Washington D.C. which effectively ended the US-Chilean Cold War alliance.[26] As Alan McPherson have shown, the Letelier assassination had a profound impact on how the US-Chilean alliance were debated in the US. Korhnbluth’s emphasis on justice as a theme in his works should be seen in the context that he was an employee of Orlando Letelier at the time of the latter’s assassination.[27]

 

Multilateralizing international affairs in the hemisphere

The second major feature of the developing literature on the US-Latin American relationship during the Cold War have been the expansion of studies from a mainly American or bilateral approach (i.e. “US and …”)[28] approach to one that encompasses the multilateral nature of inter-American affairs. Tanya Harmer have termed this the “historiographical Monroe Doctrine”, which, she points out, have made historians ignore the multilateral nature of the inter-American system and the relationship with the world beyond.[29] The part of the literature that have been most extensively developed along the multilateral approach is the literature on hemispheric affairs after the Cuban Revolution. Indeed, while there is no consensus on what constituted the Cold War in Latin America, historians tend to agree that the Cuban Revolution marked the beginning of a more intense and violent period, both in Latin America and in US interventionism.[30] This have become apparent in two manners. First in the expansion through what James Hershberg have termed the “second and third wave of missile crisis scholarship”, which builds on non-US primary sources and situates the US-Cuban confrontation within a broader regional context rather than reducing it to a superpower confrontation between Washington and Moscow.[31] The second is shown in Piero Gleijeses’ work on Cuban foreign policy towards Africa, which shows the impact countries other than the US had on regions beyond the hemisphere.

One of the first parts of the literature to be examined through a multilateral lens was the literature on the Cuban Missile Crisis. Most of the initial literature on the crisis examined it primarily from the point of view of Washington and has been portrayed as a study of crisis decision-making par excellence, much helped by accounts from members of the Kennedy administration themselves.[32] Following the end of the Cold War, historians like Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali have incorporated Soviet sources into the narrative, presenting a more dynamic confrontation between the two superpowers. Furthermore, these accounts also introduced the Cubans as autonomous actors into their own crisis, showing how Havana participated in the decision to station nuclear missiles on the island as well as its reaction to Moscow negotiating over their head.[33] The introduction of the other two “epicentric” actors have also shifted the understanding of the origin of the missile crisis. While older scholars emphasized the crisis as a result of Soviet expansionist strategic aims, the newer literature tends to emphasize the meaning of what Rabe calls the US “war on Cuba”.[34] By paying greater attention to the reactions in Havana and Moscow to the Bay of Pigs Invasion, the subsequent covert Operation Mongoose and large-scale American military maneuvers in the Caribbean, historians have recognized the importance of what Thomas Paterson have called “the Defense-of-Cuba-Theme” in explaining Havana and Moscow’s decision to send nuclear missiles to the island.[35] As such, the literature stresses the multilateral and more dynamic development of the core of the Cuban Missile Crisis.

the newer scholarship have profoundly challenged the notion that America were able to tell its Latin American partners what to do.

Historians of Hershberg’s “third wave” have further developed our understanding of the wider impact and reactions to the missile crisis and the Cuban Revolution among Latin American states. Historians like Rabe have examined the impact of the Cuban Revolution on US policy towards the region showing how the Kennedy administration sought to diplomatically and economically isolate Castro.[36] However, as Friedman have argued “mononational research tends to produce mononational explanations” and as Harmer have pointed out, American officials believed they were teaching Latin Americans about the threat from Castro.[37] Indeed, the newer scholarship have profoundly challenged the notion that America were able to tell its Latin American partners what to do. What scholars like Harmer, Renata Keller and Robert Karl have shown is that US policy towards Cuba had an important effect on the calculations of various Latin American states’ approach to the “Cuban question” but that they also sought to use the US-Cuban confrontation to alter their relationship with Washington.[38] The most illustrative part of this literature is Hershberg’s work on Brazil and its attempt to mediate between Cuba and the US. Motivated by wanting to preserve the inter-American system, Brazil sought to ease the tension between the US and Cuba. This reached a climax during the missile crisis, when Rio de Janeiro brought a message from Kennedy to Castro, seeking to initiate a dialogue for solving the crisis (the only direct attempt Kennedy made to reach Castro). What Hershberg illustrates is how the Cuban Revolution affected the inter-American system, with states like Brazil seeking to make a more important role for itself through the crisis.[39]

Soldiers of the National Liberation Front of Angola, one of three groups fighting in the Angolan Civil War. Piero Gleijeses’ work on the Cuban intervention in Angola have not only demonstrated Latin America’s crucial connections with the world beyond the hemisphere, but it also demonstrated how Cuba played a crucial role in ending white minority rule in Southern Africa. Photo: Rob Mieremet/ Anefo.

In the newer part of the literature, Cuba has also moved away from being the object of American aggression to being able to affect the outcome of the Cold War. Cuba’s revolutionary policy towards Latin America after 1959 have usually been explored by scholars as a failure, and eventually abandon after Che Guevara’s death in 1967. While historians such as Harmer suggests that the abandonment was more gradual lasting until 1975, the general consensus is that the perception of Cuba’s threat had more profound impact on Havana’s ability to conduct policy towards the region.[40] Although the extent of Cuba’s policy towards Latin America is still fairly unknown because of the limited access to Cuban archives, far more is known about Cuba’s policy towards Africa. Piero Gleijeses’s work on Cuba’s revolutionary foreign policy towards Africa shows that Havana had a more direct impact outside of Latin America than within. Particularly Cuba’s intervention in the Angolan Civil War (1975-76), conducted independently from Moscow, proved crucial for the MPLA victory and challenged South African influence in the region.[41] Furthermore, Gleijeses argues that Cuba’s continued presence in the region helped bring about the liberation of Namibia and the end of white minority rule in South Africa by the end of the Cold War.[42] By moving beyond the hemisphere, Gleijeses shows that Cuba was more than a communist outpost in the Western hemisphere, but a Cold War actor in its own right in Southern Africa, begin able to stop Washington’s own Cold War initiatives in the region.[43] As such, Gleijeses also illustrate the positive impact one of the Cold War losers had on the outcome of the Cold War, standing in sharp contrast to Rabe’s criticism of the Cold War winner’s policy in Latin America.[44]

 

Conclusion

By nuancing and decentering the understanding of American power, the newer literature on the US-Latin American relationship have emphasized agency and multilateralism in their explanations for how and why the Cold War in the region unfolded as it did. In this essay, I have examined the developments in the literature on the US-Latin American relationship during the Cold War. By looking closer at how historians have examined agency and the multilateral nature of the Western Hemisphere, I have shown how historians are arguing for a more nuanced understanding of Washington’s relationship with its neighbors. This is most clearly expressed in Tanya Harmer’s concept of the inter-American Cold War, where the US is placed as part of hemispheric affairs, being shaped by others as they shaped the US, rather than as a hegemonic outsider that could dominate events, as was the tendency in the older parts of the historiography. The US played an integral role in events like the Cuban Missile Crisis and the right-wing backlash to the rise of Salvador Allende, but they alone did not determine the outcome of these events. Indeed, in the latter case, the US was hardly able to control the military dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet and its international attempts to eliminate opposition to the new government, leading to an assassination in Washington. However, as Stephen Rabe’s concept of the Killing Zone shows, this does not omit the US of any blame for how violent the Latin American Cold War turned out. While most of this violence was carried out by local actors for their own purposes, the US actively supported and viewed it in their interests to see radical movements in the hemisphere thwarted. As in the case of the military dictatorships in Brazil and Chile, local actors took the initiatives, but the US fully supported, both vocally and materially, military coups against the popularly elected governments of João Gulart and Salvador Allende for their own Cold War interests.

 

 

 

 

[1] Gilbert M. Joseph, “Border crossings and the remaking of Latin American Cold War studies”, Cold War History 19, no. 1 (2019), 143-153

[2] Edward Crapole, “Some Reflections on the Historiography of the Cold War”, The History Teacher 20, no. 2 (1987), 251-262

[3] Greg Grandin, “Off the beach: The United States, Latin America, and the Cold War” in A Companion to Post-1945 America ed. Jean-Christophe Agnew and Roy Rosenzweig (Willston: Wiley Blackwell, 2002), 427-430. William Appleman Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy (New York: Dell, 1962)

[4] Tanya Harmer, Allende’s Chile and the Inter-American Cold War (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2011), 6-7

[5] Greg Grandin “Off the beach”, 428. Walter LaFeber Inevitable Revolutions: The United States in Central America (New York: W.W. Norton, 1993)

[6] Max Paul Friedman, “Retiring the Puppets, Bringing Latin America Back In: Recent Scholarship on United States-Latin American Relations” Diplomatic History 27, no. 5 (2003), 626

[7] Geir Lundestad, “Moralism, Presentism, Exceptionalism, Provincialism, and Other Extravagances in American Writing on the Early Cold War Years” Diplomatic History 13, no. 4 (1989), 527-545. Michael H. Hunt, “Internationalizing U.S. Diplomatic History: A Practical Agenda” Diplomatic History 15, no. 1 (1991), 1-11

[8] Stephen G. Rabe The Most Dangerous Area in the World: John F. Kennedy Confronts Communist Revolution in Latin America (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1999) Piero Gleijeses, Shattered Hope: the Guatemalan revolution and the United States, 1944-1954 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1991)

[9] Friedman “Retiring the Puppets”, 621-636. Michael J. Hogan, “The “Next Big Thing”: The Future of Diplomatic History in a Global Age”, Diplomatic History 28, no. 1 (2004), 1-21

[10] Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War – Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005)

[11] Hal Brands, Latin America’s Cold War (Cambridge, Ma: Harvard University Press, 2010), 1-8

[12] Joseph, “Border crossings”, 154-157

[13] Harmer, Allende’s Chile, 15-17

[14] Stephen G. Rabe, The Killing Zone: The United States Wages Cold War in Latin America (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), xxxi-xliii

[15] Rabe, The Killing Zone, 181-205

[16] Thomas S. Blanton, “Recovering the Memory of the Cold War, Forensic History and Latin America” in In from the Cold: Latin America’s New Encounters with the Cold War (Durham: Duke University Press, 2008) ed. Gilbert M. Joseph & Daniel Spenser, 47-74

[17] Harmer, Allende’s Chile, 7-9

[18] Kristian Gustaffson, Hostile Intent: U.S. Covert Operations in Chile, 1964-1974 (Washington D.C.: Potomac Books, 2007) Harmer, Allende’s Chile, 256-275

[19] See for example John Dinges, The Condor Years – How Pinochet and His Allies Brought Terrorism to Three Continents, (New York: The New Press, 2005)

[20] Peter Kornbluh, The Pinochet File: A Declassified Dossier on Atrocity and Accountability (New York: The New Press, 2003), 1-79

[21] Kornbluh, The Pinochet File, 489-490

[22] Harmer, Allende’s Chile, 1-19 & 255-275. Tanya Harmer, «Brazil’s Cold War in the Southern Cone, 1970-1975”, Cold War History 12, no. 4 (2012), 659-681.

[23] Rabe, The Killing Zone, 149

[24] Brands, Latin America’s Cold War, 159-160

[25] Tanya Harmer, “Fractious Allies: Chile, the United States, and the Cold War, 1973-76”, Diplomatic History 37, no. 1 (2013), 109-143

[26] Alan McPherson, “Letelier Diplomacy: Nonstate Actors and U.S.-Chilean Relations” Diplomatic History 43, no. 3 (2019): 445-468

[27] Alan McPherson, Ghost of Sheridan Circle – How A Washington Assassination Brought Pinochet’s Terror State to Justice (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2019), 78-182

[28] An excellent example of this is James F. Siekmeier’s The Bolivian Revolution and the United States, 1952 to the present (Univeristy Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2011). While Sikemeier’s study is innovating in bringing Bolivian agency in how the US approached Bolivia during the Cold War, it mainly frames its discussion in how the events related to Washington and La Paz, without bringing other states or international contexts to the table.

[29] Tanya Harmer, “The Ideological Origins of the Dirty War: Fascism, Populism, and Dictatorship in Twentieth Century Argentina”, Cold War History 15, no. 3 (2015), 417-426

[30] Tanya Harmer, “The Cold War in Latin America” in The Routledge Handbook of the Cold War ed. Artemy M. Kalinovsky & Craig Daigle (London: Taylor Francis Group, 2014), 133-148

[31] James G. Hershberg, “The Global Cuban Missile Crisis – Surfing the Third Wave of Missile Crisis Scholarship” in “The Global Cuban Missile Crisis at 50: New Evidence from behind the Iron Bamboo and Sugarcane Curtains, and beyond”, Cold War International History Project Bulletin 17/18 (2012), 7-10

[32] Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1971) an example of the literature produced by the Kennedy administration see Theodore C. Sorensen, Kennedy (New York: Harper and Row, 1965)

[33] Aleksandr Fursenko & Timothy Naftali, “One Hell of a Gamble” Khrushchev, Castro, and Kennedy, 1958-1964 (New York: W.W. Norton & Company)

[34] Rabe, The Killing Zone, 59-85

[35] Thomas G. Paterson, “Commentary: The Defense-of-Cuba Theme and the Missile Crisis” Diplomatic History 14, no. 2 (1990), 249-256, Philip Zelikow, “American Policy and Cuba, 1961-1963”, Diplomatic History 24, no. 2 (2000), 317-334, James G. Hershberg, “Before “The Missiles of October”: Did Kennedy Plan a Military Strike against Cuba?” Diplomatic History 14, no. 2 (1990), 1663-198

[36] Rabe, The Most Dangerous Area in the World: John F. Kennedy Confronts Communist Revolution in Latin America (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1999)  

[37] Harmer, “The “Cuban Question” and the Cold War in Latin America, 1959-1964”, Journal of Cold War Studies 21, no. 3 (2019), 114-151, Friedman “Retiring the Puppets”, 625-626

[38] Harmer, “The “Cuban Question”, 114-151, Renata Keller, “The Latin American Missile Crisis”, Diplomatic History 39, no. 2 (2015), 195-222, Robert Karl, “Reading the Cuban revolution from Bogotá, 1957-62” Cold War History 16, no. 4 (2016), 337-358.

[39] James G. Hershberg, “The United States, Brazil, and the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962 (Part 1)”, Journal of Cold War Studies 6, no. 2 (2004), 3-20 & “The United States, Brazil, and the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962 (Part 2)”, Journal of Cold War Studies 6, no. 3 (2004), 5-67

[40] Jorge I. Domínguez, To make a world safe for revolution: Cuba’s Foreign Policy (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1989), Tanya Harmer, “Two, Three, Many Revolutions? Cuba and the Prospects for Revolutionary Change in Latin America, 1967-1975”, Journal of Latin American studies 45, no. 1 (2013), 61-89

[41] Piero Gleijeses, Conflicting Missions – Havana, Washington and Africa, 1959-1976 (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2002), 246-346

[42] Piero Gleijeses, Visions of Freedom – Havana, Washington, Pretoria and the Struggle for Southern Africa, 1976-1991, (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2013), 503-526

[43] Gleijeses, Visions of Freedom, 9-15

[44] Rabe, The Killing Zone, 202-205

 

 

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03/21 - Makt

Leder

Hilde Gunn Slottemo - Kjønn og Makt, et historisk perspektiv

Leidulf Melve - Makt, vitskap og globalhistorie

Max Naderer - Maktens paradoks og voldens sirkel i norsk høymiddelalder

Martin Knutsen Øen - Beware the Talons: Developments in the historiography on the US-Latin American relationship during the Cold War

Frank Meyer - Mektige og avmektige jern(verks)kvinner

Theodor Jørgen Lund - Governor and Friend: The development of Severin Løvenskiold governorship until 1849 as seen through the governor’s reports to Oscar I of Sweden and Norway.

John-Wilhelm Flattun - Makt i gylne linjer: Genealogier som Propaganda

Vermund Heggeland - Kronikk: I terrorens tid?

Historikeren: Øystein Sørensen

På Forskerfronten: Alexandre Simon-Ekeland

Masteroppgaven: Sigurd Arnekleiv Bækkelund

Av Martin Knutsen Øen, Master’s student in History, University of Oslo
Publisert 29. okt. 2021 11:00 - Sist endret 29. okt. 2021 14:08